RUSSIAN ‘HYBRID WARFARE’ AND THE ANNEXATION OF CRIMEA: THE MODERN APPLICATION OF SOVIET POLITICAL WARFARE, By Richard Dietrich^*, Published by: I. B. Tauris. Written by Kent DeBenedictis, Year of Publishing: 2022. Subject Area: Soviet Military Strategy, Russian Military Strategy, History. Book Type: Military History. Total Number of Pages: 280. ISBN: 0755639995, $111.50 (Hardcover).

In this book Kent DeBenedictis examines a topic that has been of great recent interest to writers on military affairs, Russian hybrid warfare. However, in contrast to those who regard hybrid warfare as a innovation, DeBenedictis argues that ‘hybrid warfare’ is simply Soviet political warfare adapted to current conditions. To support his argument, the author examines the 1968 Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia and the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and discusses the elements of Soviet political warfare that were employed in each case. He then compares them with the 2014 Russian annexation of Crimea, pointing out the almost identical elements that were employed there, but labelled ‘hybrid warfare’.

The book consists of five chapters: an introduction; a chapter each on security environment theories, information tools, political tools, and military tools; and a conclusion. The introduction discusses the study’s methodology, the historical background of the three case studies and primary sources used in the study. The second chapter ‘Security Environment Theories’ examines Soviet perceptions of their security environment and compares them with current Russian perceptions. Using numerous political and military documents, as well as public statements by political figures, the author shows that both the Soviet Union and the Russian Federation see a continuing threat from the West that seeks to undermine them through “subversion and the covert use of military and non-military means.” (p. 31). The chapter ends with a short discussion of the elements of Soviet political warfare: overt and covert activities, strategic deception, and active measures (propaganda, disinformation, collaborators within foreign parties and foreign governments, front organizations, and agents of influence).

The analysis of the application of the principles of Soviet political warfare in Czechoslovakia and Afghanistan, and their adaptation to the post-Soviet environment in Crimea in 2014 is done in chapters three, four and five under the headings of ‘Information tools’ ‘Political tools’, and ‘Military tools’. Each chapter discusses the specific application of these tools by the Soviets in Czechoslovakia and Afghanistan, and then by the Russians in Crimea.

In chapter three, under the heading of ‘Information tools’ the writer examines Soviet and Russian ‘control of the domestic media’, ‘control of the target country’s media’, ‘propaganda’, and ‘dezinformatsia’. In the next chapter, ‘Political tools’, the writer examines the topics of ‘collaborators within foreign political parties and foreign governments’, ‘manufacturing the political process’, and ‘invasion information’. Chapter five, ‘Military tools’ looks at ‘maskirovka’, ‘threat of increased hostilities’, and ‘negotiations’. In each chapter DeBenedictus is able to show that the techniques used by the Soviets prior to and during their invasions of Czechoslovakia and Afghanistan were employed by the Russians in the run-up to, during and immediately after their move to annex Crimea.

In the conclusion the writer sums up his evidence to convincingly show that Russian ‘hybrid warfare’ is nothing more than an updated version of Soviet political warfare, adapted to the current circumstances of the Russian Federation. He also argues that this adaptation of Soviet political warfare indicates that the study of Soviet history and military strategy can be valuable for understanding Russia’s possible future actions.

Russian ‘Hybrid Warfare’ and the Annexation of Crimea is an extremely well-organized and clearly written work that provides a very convincing interpretation of Russian hybrid warfare. As an active duty major in the US Army who holds a doctorate in War Studies from King’s College, London, Kent DeBenedictis is extremely qualified to write such a study and the bibliography indicates extensive use of numerous primary and secondary sources in English, Russian and Ukrainian.

This book is an invaluable source for understanding the strategies employed in the Soviet Union’s successful invasions of Czechoslovakia in 1968 and Afghanistan in 1979, as well as the Russians’ annexation of Crimea in 2014. Although this work was written before the current war in Ukraine, it provides an excellent starting point for any analysis of Russian strategy in the current conflict. Understanding what factors made the Soviet Union and the Russian Federation successful in previous conflicts should make it easier to determine why the current war has clearly not gone the way the Russian government and armed forces expected it to.